A DIFFERENT FOURTH OF JULY

A DIFFERENT FOURTH OF JULY

The July 4^th holiday is upon us with its barbecues, parades, fireworks, as well as its grand auto and furniture sales! To be quite honest, I really resent that! My patriotism does not include buying a sofa or a pick-up truck on the 4^th and I am tired of being bombarded by TV advertisements to buy things as if were my patriotic duty! That having been said, especially of late, my thoughts on the 4^th of July have extend in a different direction ― more toward considerations of our War of Independence, the Declaration of Independence and the promises it held, and the Constitution, particularly the Preamble.

I have been doing a lot of research for a novel I am writing, a western novel, which has its roots not in the Wild West but actually in the Civil War, and it is because of this research that my thoughts today, and over the next few days this year, will, focus more on that; particularly on the Battle of Gettysburg.

In early 1863 the Army of Northern Virginia, the primary military force of the Confederacy, under General Robert E. Lee, had invaded the North, first Maryland and then Pennsylvania, with the intent of creating as much havoc as possible in that state; however and perhaps more so, with the intent of creating dissent in the Northern States where continued support for the war was shaky at best. Why, Lee considered that his “invincible” army might even be able to take Washington D.C. itself, or at least lay siege to it, and thus force a negotiated conclusion to the war, insuring the preservation and independence of the Confederacy. The people of Pennsylvania had been worried terribly but largely been spared the ravages of war except for an earlier, unsuccessful incursion by Lee. But now the storm had at last broken: 77,000 Rebel troops where now parading across the Pennsylvanian countryside. Thousands of people had fled to Philadelphia or even further north while the rest remained behind to face the Southern onslaught.

Short on supplies and equipment, and unable to get what was needed from Richmond, Lee’s forces looted the countryside, breaking into chicken coops, emptying smokehouses, granaries, and warehouses. They “confiscated” livestock (cows, goats, and sheep) and took the horses. They also commandeered supplies such as leather goods, hats, shoes (or the materials to make shoes ― but especially ready-made shoes ― as countless “Rebs” were barefoot.) Oh, the Rebel Army leadership did often pay for their booty, but only with Confederate script ― itself worthless.

The typical procedure for the invaders, whenever they encountered a new town, was to gather all the residents together in the town square and then to demand “tribute” from them in exchange for not burning their town to the ground, as they had done in the town of York, Pennsylvania. A “tribute” could easily consist of 30,000 pounds of bread, 3,500 pounds of sugar, 2,000 pounds of coffee, 30,000 pounds of beef, pork, and hams, whatever shoes or boots could be found, and cash: sometimes as much as $30,000 to $50,000. A letter to home from a member of the 55^th Virginia Regiment reported, “We took a lot of negroes yesterday.” Freeman or escaped slave, it made no difference ― they were “confiscated” and placed in servitude to the Confederate Army or sent south to become privately owned slaves.

By the end of June, 1863, the invasion by the Army of Northern Virginia was in its third week, with its forces scattered over the countryside from Chambersburg in the west to Harrisburg in the north. The Army of the Potomac was, however, in pursuit and Lee knew it. The scattering of his forces was due to the fact that he had absolutely no idea of just where the Union forces were or how close they were ― and they were close! Armies at that time depended almost entirely on their cavalry to provide reconnaissance and intelligence due to their quick and easy mobility in comparison to the infantry or artillery. Lee’s prized and proven cavalry, under Major General James E. B. “Jeb” Stuart had attempted to ride around the Union Army in the east while Lee’s main body moved northward up the Shenandoah Valley, screened by the Blue Ridge Mountains. Stuart had hoped to wreak havoc on the rear of the Union troops, disrupt communications, and grab a few headlines for himself. The Union Army had moved faster than had been anticipated by either Lee or Stuart and the latter soon found that he was too far east and had been cut off from access to Lee.

In the absence of the desired intelligence from his prized cavalry, General Lee assumed, for the time being, that “no news was good news” and thus the Union forces must still have been far to the south: still in Virginia. He had no idea of what was coming ― not until June 28^th ― and the information he needed did not come from “Jeb” Stuart but rather from a spy (“Scout” was the preferred term) in the employ of General James “Old Pete” Longstreet. The Union army was not in Virginia but had in fact crossed the Potomac into Maryland two days earlier and was moving north at a fast speed. They were close and led by a new general, George Meade. Lee immediately sent out couriers in all directions across the state with orders to fall back to and reunite at Cashtown or at the quiet, crossroads town eight miles further north, Gettysburg.

*****

The vanguard of Lee’s main force was Major General Henry Heth’s division; one of three divisions of the army’s newly formed 3^rd Corps, located at Cashtown.  While waiting for other divisions to catch up with him, Heth chose to send a raiding party the short distance north to Gettysburg where it was rumored that there was a stock of some 2,000 shoes, critically needed by his troops. He assigned the task to one of his four brigades led by Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew whose standing order was to withdraw without a fight if any resistance was encountered; the belief being that Gettysburg might be protected by a small number of local militia. Off went Pettigrew with three of his four regiments, some 1,800 men and a group of wagons, to fetch the shoes ― or anything else they could lay their hands on.

On that very same day, June 30^th, at about mid-morning, a column of approximately 2,900 Union cavalry, led by Brigadier General John Buford, a mild, pragmatic man driven by a strong sense of dedication and duty, rode into Gettysburg to the cheers of the local residents who in short order reported to him that there was a force of Confederate troops headed that way from Cashtown along the Chambersburg Pike ― just what he had been looking for. Immediately he ordered his men to spread out into the countryside, northwest, west, and southwest to ascertain the size and location of the inbound army.

At that very same time Pettigrew’s column approached the town and Buford’s men were plainly visible as they fanned out from the town through the neighboring fields and along the adjoining ridges. Alas for Pettigrew, he had his orders, but not just orders, they were orders which had come directly from Robert E. Lee ― “Don’t start a fight.” The General obediently turned his column around and marched back to Cashtown empty handed. The story (from more than one source) is told that General Buford rode out the Chambersburg Pike and arrived there just as Pettigrew’s men were cresting Herr’s Ridge. A lone figure on horseback, wearing a large, broad-brimmed hat was seen silhouetted against the sky as the last Confederate troops crested the hill and disappeared. The figure, believed to be General Pettigrew himself, turned to face the Union cavalry, doffed his hat with a wild flourish, bowed, and then disappeared down the west side of the ridge.

When Pettigrew made his report later that day to Corps Commander General A. P. Hill and General Heth, neither of them would believe him. It had to have been local militia. Even though Pettigrew was not a professional soldier, he told them in no uncertain terms that he knew the Army of the Potomac and well-trained cavalry when he saw it. Certain that Pettigrew was mistaken, Heth asked permission of Hill to try again the next day. Hill gave Heth his blessing.

The remainder of Lee’s three corps were moving quickly to reunite. General Richard S. Ewell’s 2^nd Corps was racing southward from Harrisburg and Longstreet’s 1^st Corp was on forced march from Chambersburg bound for Cashtown. At the very same time, General Mead’s Union forces, consisting of seven smaller corps, were still in northern Maryland but moving north quickly. Two of the corps, the I and XI Corps, would arrive at Gettysburg the next morning.

The critical factor, the one which made Gettysburg so important was not the cache of shoes (which really didn’t exist) but the fact that the town was situated where twelve roads all converged from all directions ― an important asset to any army. John Buford noted this as his eyes scanned the surrounding topography. It was “good ground” and he determined to defend it as best as he could; particularly to the west where he decided to fight the major portion of a holding action along Herr’s ridge, running north-south, two miles west of town, and then the parallel McPherson’s Ridge, a mile west of town, and then Seminary ridge, three-quarters of a mile west of Gettysburg, upon which a Lutheran seminary was located, until the two closest infantry corps arrived in the morning.

Buford also noted the deep trench of an incomplete railroad cut northwest of town and also two prominent hills to the southeast, 100-foot Cemetery Hill and its Evergreen Cemetery and a smaller yet steeper, heavily wooded hill, Culp’s Hill, just a half mile east of it. To the south of Cemetery Hill, just a mile and a half away, were two even higher, round hills ― the Round Tops ― connected to Cemetery Hill by a series of gentle rises and hills. Little Round Top was very steep, rocky and treacherous, clear-cut on its western side: very defensible. The bigger of the two, just to the south, was the wooded Big Round Top. To the west lay fenced farmland, wheat fields and orchards: some beautiful country. If one viewed the topography from above, the formations General Buford had chosen to defend look very much like an inverted fishhook with Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill as the hook. As Colonel Charles Thomas Campbell, remarked to his commander, General Buford, “It’s definitely good ground.”

Buford spent the rest of the evening and night planning his defense ― “Keep the Rebels from taking the high ground.” He knew that he would have to “fight like the devil until help arrives.”

And so the stage was set ― Lee’s troops eight miles to the west and more coming, while eight miles to the south, the Union I and XI Corps were bivouacking ― and he was in the middle.